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SAMPLE NINTH CIRCUIT BRIEF

The following is a sample brief to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals drafted by On-Point Paralegal Services, LLC. The parties names, docket numbers and other personal information has been omitted. We have done our best to preserve the formatting of the brief when converting it to html code for display on the Internet.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. _____________________


EDWARD XXXXXXX, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant


v.


MIKE XXXXXXXXXXXXX, LARRY A.
XXXXXXXXXXXXX, And JOHN DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants-Respondents

__________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
__________________________________________

Initial Brief For Plaintiff-Appellant,
Edward XXXXXXX, Jr.
__________________________________________


EDWARD XXXXXXX, JR.
XXXXXXXXX Drive
XXXXXXXX, California XXXXXX
Tel. XXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Dated:

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table Of Authorities ……………………………………………………. 3

Corporate Disclosure Statement ………………………………………... 4

Jurisdictional Statement ………………………………….………………4

Ninth Circuit Local Rule 28-2.6 Statement …………………………..… 5

Statement Of Issues Presented For Review …………………………….. 5

Statement Of The Case ………………………………………………….. 6

Statement Of The Facts …………………………………………………. 6

Summary Of Argument ……………………………………..….,……… 11

ARGUMENT

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANTS' PROFFERED NON-DISCRIMINATORY REASONS FOR PLAINTIFF'S BEING FORCED TO RESIGN ON THE BASIS OF HIS RACE WAS A MERE PRETEXT FOR UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT
……………………………………………………………………. 11

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE BECAUSE A JURY IS REQUIRED TO MAKE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS
………………………………………………………………....….. 14

III. PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE BEFORE THE XXXXXXXXXXXXX TOOK AN ADVERSE ACTION AGAINST HIM THAT MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE TERMS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
………………………………………………………………..…. 15

Conclusion ………………………………………………………….… 17

Certificate of Compliance …………………………………………….. 18

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Caselaws:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ……………………. 14

Bass vs. Bd. Of County Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 2001) …..…… 14

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000) ……………….. 17

Carey vs. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) …………………………………..... 16

Garrett vs. Hewlett Packard Co., 305 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) ……….… 13

Giacoletto vs. Amax Zinc. Co., 954 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1992) ………….….. 14

Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997) ……………………………………. 16

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) ………………………. 17

Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 2004) ….. 5

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ………………………………... 16

Price vs. Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1996) ……………………….…. 16

Russell vs. TG Mo. Corp., 340 F.3d 735 (8th Cir 2003) ………………….... 13

Stern vs. Trs. Of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 1997) ………..… 14

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Statutes:

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 ……………………………………………....… 5, 6, 8

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 ……………………………………………...…. 5, 6, 8

42 U.S.C. Secs. 1985 …………………………………………..…… 5, 6, 8

42 U.S.C. §1986 ……………………………………………………… 8, 14


CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

This statement is made pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1. Plaintiff is not a corporate entity and has no parent corporation, subsidiaries or affiliates that has issued shares to the public.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The court below had jurisdiction to entertain this matter because all claims brought herein related to alleged violations of the United States Constitution and various federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1985 and 1981. The claims were brought by virtue of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. Final Judgment was rendered on September 13, 2005. [App621, Volume IV] Plaintiff filed a timely Notice of Appeal on October 13, 2005. [App633]

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NINTH CIRCUIT LOCAL RULE 28-2.6 STATEMENT

Plaintiff has no knowledge of any pending cases related to the issues herein.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Was plaintiff entitled to survive summary judgment on his hostile work environment and retaliation claims as a matter of law if he was able to prove that (a) he filed two EEOC complaints against the defendant employer, (b) a period of harassment and retaliation endured over the next nineteen months and (c) plaintiff was forced to retire at the expiration of that nineteen month period after having been employed by the XXXXXXXXXXXXX since 1984? Plaintiff submits that the answer to this is "yes". The standard of review of the trial court's order of summary judgment is de novo. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Systems Co., 362 F.3d 564 (9th Cir. 2004), and cases cited.

2. May a trial court make a credibility determination during a motion for summary judgment regarding the meaning of or intent behind circumstantial evidence in a hostile work environment / retaliation action? Plaintiff submits that the answer to this is "no". The standard of review of the trial court's order of summary judgment is de novo. Id.

3. If an employee of a governmental entity is entitled to appear and defend at a disciplinary hearing, although California state law may not provide detailed notice requirements, does the federal constitution mandate such safeguards as a matter of procedural due process? The standard of review of the trial court's order of summary judgment is de novo. Id.


STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action brought for workplace discrimination, harassment and retaliation. Plaintiff asserts denial of equal protection under the law, violation of procedural due process with regard to disciplinary hearings, conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1985 and 1981, with all claims being brought by virtue of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that plaintiff, an African-American, was discriminated and retaliated against during the course of his employment with the California XXXXXXXXXXXXX Services. [App2, Vol. I] His position was XXXXXXXXXX. [App3, App5, Vol. I]

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Mike XXXXXXXXXXXXX ("XXXXXXXXXXXXX"), a Caucasian-American male, who holds the position of XXXXXXXXXXXX and was plaintiff's supervisor, and Defendant Larry A. XXXXXXXXXXXXX ("XXXXXXXXXXXXX"), also a Caucasian-American male, discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of plaintiff's race and/or retaliated against him for having filed claims of discrimination against defendant. [App3, App5, Vol. I] Plaintiff also alleged that XXXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXXX conspired between themselves or with others to discriminate against plaintiff or to otherwise retaliate against him for the before mentioned reasons. [App3, App5, Vol. I]

Plaintiff alleges that the defendants committed all acts, individually and collectively, while acting under color of state law, to further their own personal interests, while an agent of the California XXXXXXXXXXXXX, that they singled him out from amongst all of the employees on the basis of his race and that at all relevant times they were acting outside of the scope of their employment. [App3-App5]

Plaintiff alleged that official policies and procedures of the California XXXXXXXXXXXXX endorsed or otherwise led to the alleged discriminatory and retaliatory conduct engaged in by the individual defendants, that the defendants violated plaintiff's well-established law that they were or should have been aware of and that such conduct constituted a continuing pattern. [App11-App12, Vol. I] The Complaint, read as a whole, implies that the defendants were sued in both their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. [App12, Vol. I]

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Plaintiff brought claims alleging a violation of the United States Constitution including the Equal Protection Clause thereof (as applicable to the states by and through the Fourteenth Amendment) [App11, Vol. I]; 42 U.S.C. §1985 (conspiracy to violate civil rights) [App13, Vol. I]; 42 U.S.C. §1986 (failure to prevent a conspiracy that violates 42 U.S.C. §1985) [App3, Vol. I]; 42 U.S.C. §1981 [App14, Vol. I]; a claim for declaratory relief [App15, Vol. I], and sought relief for all claims by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983. [App11, App16, Vol. I]

The parties entered into a stipulation to dismiss plaintiff's claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1985 and 42 U.S.C. §1986 as they related to XXXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXXX, and all references to Title VII or to 42 U.S.C. §2000e. [App36, Vol. I] Plaintiff thereafter filed a First Amended Complaint to conform to that stipulation. [App19, Vol. I] Those were the only changes made.
Defendant's Answer, filed on June 7, 2004 (six months after the filing of the First Amended Complaint for a reason that is not clear from the record), denied all of the allegations. [App36, Vol. I]

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative for partial summary judgment, on January 7, 2005. [App49, Vol. I] The court ultimately granted that motion in its entirety [App621, Vol. IV]. The trial court held, inter alia,

(a) It was not a violation of procedural due process for the XXXXXXXXXXXXX to give plaintiff untimely notice of a hearing and the date thereof relating to an investigation of him. The trial court held that this was not a violation of procedural due process because no timing requirements are set forth in the California Statutes, but the court made no mention of such requirements imposed by the United States Constitution. The court dismissed plaintiff's claims in this regard, concluding that, "[A] purported delay in notification as a matter of law, is not an adverse employment action since it is not reasonably likely that it would deter an employee from engaging in protected activity." [App623, Vol. IV]

(b) Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges that he was discriminated and retaliated against on the basis of his race and for filing claims of workplace discrimination. Plaintiff was subjected to various counseling sessions for what he contends were all frivolous allegations, such as that he sleeps on the job. The trial court held that, "[N]othing in the record shows that the counseling sessions had any impact on plaintiff's career or negative effect that would reasonably deter an employee from engaging in protected activity." [App623, Vol. IV]

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(c) Plaintiff alleges that his office was audited as an act of discrimination due to his race, and that he was retaliated in such a manner for filing complaints of workplace discrimination. The trial court held that there was no proof that plaintiff was singled out due to the fact that XXXXXXXXXXXXX had conducted one audit in the past before plaintiff's, and because he had conducted two audits of two different office's since plaintiff's. "[N]othing in the record suggests that the audit had any effect on plaintiff that would be reasonably likely to deter an employee from engaging in protected activity." [App624, Vol. IV]

(d) In addition to auditing and counseling sessions as described above, plaintiff alleged that he was denied the opportunity to serve as a temporary region supervisor, training and supervisor meetings were denied to his office, there was a failure to provide his office with ammunition and other necessities like business cards, a failure to investigate complaints lodged by plaintiff and a denial of opportunity to participate as a XXXXXXXXX in firearms qualification. The trial court considered all of these issues individually, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances, and held as to each individual incident that it did not have an adverse impact upon plaintiff's employment or a chilling effect upon a desire to file a complaint of discrimination when necessary. [App624-App626, Vol. IV]

(e) Plaintiff filed his EEOC complaints on January 18, 2003 and March 31, 2003. The before mentioned "Notice incident" set forth in paragraph (a), above, did not occur until May 2, 2004. The trial court held that the thirteen to nineteen month lapse of time negated an inference of retaliation. The court made no mention that it took into consideration the totality of the circumstances, considered the before mentioned additional evidence along with the "Notice incident" or considered whether there was a continuing course of conduct from the time that the EEOC complaints were filed. [App627, Vol. IV]

(f) The "Notice incident' concerned, inter alia, allegations from one Ms. XXXXXXXXXXXXX that plaintiff sexually assaulted her and that plaintiff violated XXXXXXXXXXXXX policy by dating her. Defendants conceded, however, that they never believed the allegation of sexual assault and XXXXXXXXXXXXX admitted during his deposition that the dating was not a violation of XXXXXXXXXXXXX policy. The trial court held that there was no inference that this incident was a pretext for unlawful discrimination and retaliation. Again, this incident was not considered along with the totality of the circumstances. [App628, Vol. IV]

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Defendants thereafter made an application for attorney's fees. That motion was denied, and defendants have not filed a Notice of Appeal concerning that issue. Finally, defendant's made an application for costs [App618, Vol. IV] that was granted by the court in the amount of $1,800.60. [App621, Vol. IV] Plaintiff also appeals from that award of costs.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Plaintiff submits that the trial court made credibility determinations during a motion for summary judgment regarding the meaning of and intent underlying circumstantial evidence. Plaintiff also alleges that the trial court considered separately each alleged incident of discrimination or retaliation, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances. Plaintiff's argument is that these are both reversible errors.

ARGUMENT

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE A DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS TO WHETHER DEFENDANTS' PROFFERED NONDISCRIMINATORY REASONS FOR PLAINTIFF'S BEING FORCED TO RESIGN ON THE BASIS OF HIS RACE WAS A MERE PRETEXT FOR UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT

Defendant XXXXXXXXXXXXX testified at his deposition that it would not have been a violation of the XXXXXXXXXXXXX's policies for plaintiff to date XXXXXXXXXXXXX. It also went undisputed below that the Department did not believe XXXXXXXXXXXXX's allegations of sexual assault and that plaintiff did not have any further contact with XXXXXXXXXXXXX after he was instructed not to do so. The evidence showed that the decision to terminate plaintiff was made by XXXXXXXXXXXXX, and that the only other employees that XXXXXXXXXXXXX has ever recommended for dismissal were for incidents of misconduct that constituted a violation of the law, with the sole exception of one incident where someone was terminated for inappropriate use of a state vehicle. It should be noted that the individual terminated for inappropriate use of a state vehicle had a history of misconduct, and that all persons received warnings and reprimands before their termination. Plaintiff received no pre-termination warning or reprimand which was a violation of XXXXXXXXXXXXX policy. (XXXXXXXXXXXXX Deposition, App685, Vol. IV, at 49:24-25; XXXXXXXXXXXXX Deposition, App686, Vol. IV, at 50:1-2; XXXXXXXXXXXXX Deposition, App646-App661, Vol. IV, at Pgs. 10-25; XXXXXXXXXXXXX Deposition, App692, Vol. IV, at 56:10-25; XXXXXXX Deposition, App1113, Vol. VI, at 221:1-24; XXXXXXX Deposition, App1114, Vol. VI, at 222:18-24; XXXXXXX Deposition, App1115, Vol. VI, at 223; XXXXXXX Deposition, App1116, Vol. VI, at 224:1-8; Plaintiff's Exhibit A, App396, pg. 6-2)

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The evidence also showed that XXXXXXX, an African-American, was terminated for alleged conduct that was trivial compared to incidents committed by Caucasian males that go virtually unpunished. (XXXXXXXXXXXXX Dep., 79:19-25, 80:1-11, Plaintiff's Exhibit 22; XXXXXXX Dep., App.1048, at 155:3-25; XXXXXXX Dep., App.1051, at 158:22-25; XXXXXXX Dep., App.1052, at 159:1-6; Defendants' Exhibits 24 and 27, App83, Vol. I; Bibbs Decl., App540, Vol. II, at §§ 4, 5, 7).
Evidence that a member of a protected class is treated differently in the workplace than persons who are not members of a protected class is sufficient to rebut defendants' claims of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for plaintiff's workplace harassment and retaliation.

The court should note that this is not a wrongful termination or constructive discharge case. Plaintiff has brought neither of those claims. Rather, plaintiff is solely suing for the harassment and retaliation he endured in the workplace. Being subjected to harassment or retaliation with a discriminatory intent states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Aside from run-of-the-mill employment related causes of action, plaintiff could have recovered against the individual defendants who were sued in both their individual and official capacities on a theory of outrage or negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court, however, only analyzed this case under employment law theories.

The evidence shows that plaintiff filed a claim of discrimination with the EEOC, and that after doing so his employment situation with a year had grown distasteful to the extent that he was left with no alternative but to resign. Plaintiff's evidence shows that his employer deviated from company policy or procedure on multiple occasions. See Garrett vs. Hewlett Packard Co., 305 F.2d 1210, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that deviations from an employer's regular procedures established pretext); Russell vs. TG Mo. Corp., 340 F.3d 735, 746 (8th Cir 2003) ("We agree … that an employer's deviation from its own policies can, in some instances, provide evidence of pretext"); Bass vs. Bd. Of County Comm'rs, 256 F.3d 1095, 1108 (11th Cir. 2001) ("An employer's violation of its own normal hiring procedure [was] evidence of pretext"); Stern vs. Trs. Of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305, 313 (2nd Cir. 1997) (reiterating that an employer's departure from regular procedures can be indicative of pretext); Giacoletto vs. Amax Zinc. Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The jury could reasonably have concluded that because Amax neglected to follow[its] procedures for helping employees to overcome their deficiencies, the company had fired Giacoletto not because of his asserted deficiencies, but to retaliate [against him]").

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II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE BECAUSE A JURY IS REQUIRED TO MAKE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS

"Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In order to properly dispose of plaintiff's claims, the court had to make credibility determinations as to various material issues of disputed fact. This included credibility determinations as to, inter alia,

 

(a) Whether XXXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXXX encouraged and organized fellow employees to file complaints against plaintiff so that XXXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXXX could create a pre-text for forcing plaintiff to retire and creating a hostile work environment for him in general [App291-App292, Vol. I0 I];

(b) Whether plaintiff had a history of falling asleep on the job [App296, App311-App312, Vol. II];

(c) Whether plaintiff was harassed for having diabetes by way of being required to show his superiors his medications and provide repeated explanations [App299 and App307, Vol. II];

(d) Whether Caucasian employees could commit much more serious infractions, such as physical assault, without being penalized at all [App304, Vol. II]

(e) Whether plaintiff had two personnel files, one with all of the adverse information about him and one without it [App305, Vol. II]; and,

(f) Whether plaintiff received notice of adverse materials being placed in his personnel file to enable him to dispute it [App306 and App316, Vol. II].

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All of these facts are determinative as to instant claims and require credibility determinations. Only a jury may do that. Id.

III. PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO NOTICE BEFORE THE XXXXXXXXXXXXX TOOK AN ADVERSE ACTION AGAINST HIM THAT MAY HAVE AFFECTED THE TERMS OF HIS EMPLOYMENT

A governmental employee is entitled to notice of hearing as a matter of procedural due process guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because their job is a constitutionally protected liberty and property interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928 (1997). The trial court held not only that plaintiff had no right to fair notice and hearing under California law, and totally ignored federal constitutional law in this regard, but also held that such conduct was unlikely to be a deterrent to employees who may want to engage in legally protected conduct such as filing complaints of discrimination.

Plaintiff respectfully disagrees with the trial court that deprivation of constitutionally protected due process rights before adverse action is taken against an employee could not deter that employee from engaging in constitutionally protected conduct. In fact, our Supreme Court has held that deprivation of due process is such a significant issue that at least nominal damages are always available as a simple recognition that a deprivation occurred. Carey vs. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (nominal damages available for denial of procedural due process rights); Price vs. Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1246 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that "the rationale for the award of nominal damages being that federal courts should provide some marginal vindication for a constitutional violation").

The District Court's message here is that any employee who engages in such conduct (reporting racial discrimination, for example) will be penalized without being afforded fair opportunity to defend against the charges. That is bad law, bad rationale and a bad overall adjudication. This court is asked to reject it by remanding the case for further proceedings on this issue.

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IV. IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT CONSIDER THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES

The trial court did not consider the totality of the circumstances. It considered each alleged incident of discriminatory conduct separate and distinctly. That was an error. See Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We use a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a plaintiff's allegations make out a colorable claim of hostile work environment"), citing Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).


CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the court should reverse the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings.

Respectfully Submitted,


______________________________
XXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Dated:

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 29(d) and 32(a)(7)(C), I certify that this brief is proportionately space with one inch margins on all four corners with a total of ________ words.

______________________________
Edward XXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Dated:

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